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NOTE
THE DIVERGENCE OF BINARY SEX AND THE
TRANSGENDER
Kelsey Marie Pittman†
ABSTRACT
While the overarching and popular thought in the United States has been
that a person’s sex is either male or female, in recent years, this principle has
been shaken to its core. There has been heightened awareness of
transgender persons whose inner gender has grown to become the opposite
of that person’s biological sex. The transgender community has watched the
masses become open to the idea that a person could have the biology of one
sex and the gender of another. This apparent acceptance has become a
catapult for the transgender community to express their inner gender
through manifestations of that gender. While there has been monumental
support for transgender rights in the law, there has also been considerable
push-back. This has led to lawsuits wherein the court system must now
determine if it will open its arms to the transgender community. During
these primordial stages of the intersection between the law and transgender
rights, the courts must determine how the law should evolve so that it can
appropriately accommodate the transgender person, as well as the general
public.
Many transgender people argue for a legal definition of sex that is
determined by gender identity. Many transgender advocates argue for a
legal definition of sex that is determined by gender identity, rather than
biological sex, in order to access the restroom that matches their inner
gender. Courts wrestle with the issue of whether the legal definition of sex
should be defined by gender identity.
This Note will focus on the legal definition of sex and argue that the
dissenting opinion of Judge Niemeyer in Grimm v. Gloucester was correct in
reasoning that the definition of sex should remain the physiological
distinctions between males and females.
Grimm v. Gloucester involved a suit by a young woman who sought
access to the restroom that matched her gender identity rather than her
† Kelsey Marie Pittman, 2018 Juris Doctor Candidate, Liberty University School of
Law. I would like to thank my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ for re-writing my story so that I
could write this Note. Also, I would like to thank my parents and my fiancé for their endless
love and support.

762

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:761

biological sex. This Note will seek to resolve this issue by arguing that there
is a way that the law can accommodate both the concerns of the transgender
and the collective public. Instead of merely shifting the burden onto the
transgender individual, or the collective public, a balanced approach can
both protect the transgender and allow the legal definition of sex to remain
as the physiological distinctions between males and females.
To achieve this balanced approach, transgender should be considered as a
legally recognized branch of sex. A legally recognizable transgender should be
characterized and defined as having physiological distinctions separate from,
and opposed to, those of males and females. This Note argues that in order to
be a legally recognized and protected transgender under law, a person must
either have a skewed chromosome count, have sex reassignment surgery, be
intersex, or have any other physiological difference excluding a person from
fitting into either category of male or female.
If the law were to recognize this definition of the transgender and keep
the traditional definition of sex, the culture war over restrooms and other
transgender rights would draw closer to resolution. The status of
transgender would no longer be based solely on a person’s subjective beliefs
of gender identity. This would abrogate uncertainty and speculation in a
variety of legal situations, such as when a court decides a case based on
transgender rights, when a jury must render a verdict on whether a person
identified with a specific gender at a certain time, or when a person is
simply seeking to avoid the unlawful conduct of accessing a restroom built
for a specific gender.
This Note proposes a two-step analysis in determining whether a
transgender person has a right to access a restroom that is in accord with
gender identity. The courts must first determine whether the person is a
legally recognized transgender. Second, the courts must determine whether
the transgender person’s injury is sufficient to provide standing in court.
This framework must be viewed through the lens of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress (I.I.E.D) because the policy underlying this
cause of action applies to transgender rights—i.e., the court should not have
to decide cases where the injury to the plaintiff is hurt feelings alone.
Through this analysis, the transgender person will have the right to access
the restroom that matches their gender identity and the public would retain
the historical separation of restrooms by physiological distinctions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The term gender identity was first used in the United States in a press release
on November 21, 1966, to announce the new clinic for transsexuals at the Johns
Hopkins Hospital.1 The term has now become a regular part of American
vocabulary.2 The terms transsexual and transgender are used synonymously to
articulate a state in which the apparent gender (determined at birth) of a person
does not match the subjective gender.3 Medical research suggests that the cause
of this incongruence of apparent and subjective gender could be due to
“exposure . . . to the ‘wrong’ hormones during the development of the brain,
such that the anatomic physical body and the brain develop in different gender
paths.”4 This incongruence between body and mind ultimately may cause the
mental disorder of gender identity disorder or gender dysphoria.5 To suppress
the effects of gender dysphoria, transgender persons often seek to live their lives
in conformity with their subjective gender.6 This includes dressing, speaking,
and acting in accordance with the transgender person’s gender identity.7 To
fully act in accord with one’s gender identity, many transgender people believe
that they must use the restroom of the sex that matches their gender identity;
this restroom use has become a flashpoint for legal disputes.8

1. J. Money, The concept of gender identity disorder in childhood and adolescence after
39 years., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7996589 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017).
http://www.merriam2. See,
e.g.,
Transsexual,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
webster.com/dictionary/transsexual.
3. What is the Difference Between Transgender And Transsexual?, TRANS-AWARENESS
PROJECT, http://www.transawareness.org/what-is-the-difference-between-transgender-andtranssexual.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017); Prabhat S., Difference between Transgender and
BETWEEN.NET,
Transsexual,
DIFFERENCE
http://www.differencebetween.net/science/difference-between-transgender-and-transsexual/
(last visited on Sept. 16, 2017).
4. CHRISTINE MICHELLE DUFFY, GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 16-77 (2014).
5. The disorder is sometimes accompanied by a desire to change one's anatomic features to
conform physically with one's perception of self through hormone therapy, surgery, or
psychological counseling. They may also choose to live in their preferred gender role by dressing,
naming, and conducting themselves in conformity with that gender. Farmer v. Mortsugu, 163
F.3d 610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The American Psychiatric Association defines gender dysphoria as
“the distress that may accompany the incongruence between one’s experienced and expressed
gender and one’s assigned gender.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013).
6. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
7. When You Don’t Feel at Home With Your Gender, WEBMD (last updated Sept. 9,
2016), http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/gender-dysphoria?page=3.
8. See id.
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II. BACKGROUND
The root issue of legal disputes concerning transgender rights is whether
gender identity should be included in the definition of sex. The definition of
sex that is inclusive of gender identity breaks from the traditional definition
of sex that has historically been guided by physiological distinctions.9 The
answer to this novel question has caused courts to split. Older court cases
have excluded gender identity as being a part of the definition of sex, while
recent court cases have taken an inclusive view of gender identity.10
Numerous court opinions have argued that the two sexes have been
differentiated throughout time and society based on biological differences.11
Title VII claims have been struck down on the grounds that discrimination
against “a biological male who takes female hormones, cross-dresses, and
has surgically altered parts of [his] body to make it appear to be female” is
not sex discrimination.12 The Seventh Circuit came to this very conclusion
and reasoned that “even if one believes that a woman can be so easily
created from what remains of a man,” surgical change into a certain sex
does not decide cases based on sex discrimination.13 In Ulane, the Seventh

9. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 730.
10. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721 (stating the dictionary “definitions also suggest that a hardand-fast binary division on the basis of reproductive organs—although useful in most
cases—was not universally descriptive”).
11. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 734 (stating that “[a]cross societies and throughout history, it
has been commonplace and universally accepted to separate public restrooms, locker rooms,
and shower facilities on the basis of biological sex in order to address privacy and safety
concerns arising from the biological differences between males and females”); Johnston v.
Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 672 (W.D. Pa. 2015)
(holding that because a transgender university student failed to state an Equal Protection
claim based on his transgender status, the university’s policy of segregating bathroom and
locker room facilities on the basis of birth sex was “substantially related to a sufficiently
important government interest” and therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause)
(quoting Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011)); Etsitty v. Utah Transit
Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding discrimination based on a person’s
transsexual status is not discrimination because gender identity is not a protected class under
Title VII); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Title
VII does not protect transsexuals); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D.
Ohio 2003) (holding that for an employer to require an employee use only the men’s
restroom as a transgender male was not sex stereotyping discrimination under Title VII);
Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that while the plaintiff
properly stated a violation of Equal Protection based on sex stereotyping, the fact that the
plaintiff was transgender was not the grounds for the Equal Protection claim).
12. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
13. Id.
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Circuit’s reasoning was guided by the binary differentiation of the sexes
determined by physiological distinctions.14
On the other hand, the court in Grimm v. Gloucester made it clear that
gender identity should be included in the legal definition of sex.15 The court
used a definition of sex that is the sum of factors such as a “typical
dichotomous occurrence” of physical, psychological, and social aspects that
are typically manifested as male and female.16 In Grimm, the plaintiff, G.G.,
is a high school student who is biologically female and suffers from gender
dysphoria as a result of the incongruence between her biological sex and
gender identity.17 G.G.’s therapist recommended that G.G. should change
her lifestyle to be consistent with her gender identity so that the symptoms
of her gender dysphoria would not become more severe.18 Acting on that
advice, G.G.’s family informed the school board that she should be treated
as a boy by teachers and staff.19
The school board allowed G.G. to use the boys’ restroom, but this
decision was met with considerable disdain from the public.20 The public
outcry caused the school board to recant its decision to allow G.G. to use
the boys’ restroom and bar G.G. from the boys’ restroom, thus confining
her to the girls’ and unisex restrooms.21 G.G’s mother brought an action
against Gloucester High School, challenging the school board’s policy that
required students to use the restroom consistent with their birth sex rather
than gender identity.22 The United States District Court of the Eastern
District of Virginia found that the school board did not violate Title IX by
limiting transgender students to the use of the restroom consistent with the
student’s birth sex.23 The court reasoned that restrooms and locker rooms
are necessarily separate because of the need for privacy due to the
physiological distinctions between the sexes.24 G.G.’s mother, Deirdre
14. Id.
15. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721.
16. Id. at 721-22.
17. Id. at 715. For the purposes of this Note, pronouns referring to a person’s sex will be
consistent with that person’s sex as determined by that person’s physiology in accordance
with the conclusion of this Note which is that sex should be defined by physiology.
18. Grimm, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 715-16.
19. Id. at 715.
20. Id. at 715-16.
21. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 715-16.
22. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 742 (E.D. Va.
2015).
23. Id. at 744.
24. Id. at 750. See also Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 1993).
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Grimm, appealed the ruling, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court.25 The Fourth Circuit adhered to the Department
of Education’s interpretation of which restroom a transgender individual
should use.26 The Department of Education’s letter determined that the
definition of sex includes gender identity.27 According to the letter, a
student’s gender identity is the student’s sex for purposes of settling Title IX
disputes.28
The dissenting opinion in Grimm reasoned correctly as to the legal
definition of sex. Judge Niemeyer set out the policy reasons for why sex
should be determined by physiological distinctions rather than gender
identity.29 He stated that the Constitution calls for the protection of
personal privacy.30 He reasoned that this privacy is inherent in the nature
and dignity of mankind, and the separation of restrooms according to
physiological distinctions is crucial to the protection of this privacy.31 In his
dissent, Niemeyer used multiple dictionary definitions where the definition
of sex is shaped by the physiological differences between reproductive
organs; none of these definitions included gender identity.32 He reasoned
that if the legal definition of sex could also be the gender a person identifies
with, then the enforcement of any separation of bathroom facilities would
be impossible. Such a definition would destroy the Constitution’s
protection of personal privacy within restrooms.33
Niemeyer further argued that the inclusion of gender identity in the
definition of sex would require gender stereotyping, which is exactly what
the majority opinion sought to avoid.34 The majority opinion argued that
sex could not be based on a student’s clothing, speech, or mannerisms
because this would be gender stereotyping.35 However, if gender identity is
25. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 715.
26. Id. at 721-23.
27. Id. at 721.
28. U.S. Departments of Justice and Education Release Joint Guidance to Help Schools
Ensure the Civil Rights of Transgender Students, DOJ 16-568, 2016 Westlaw 2766271 (May
13, 2016).
29. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 730-731 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
30. Id. at 734-35 (citing Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 494 (6th Cir.
2008)).
31. Id. (citing Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2011)).
32. Id. at 736-37.
33. Id. at 734-35.
34. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 730 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. See id.
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included in the definition of sex, a school would have to decide which
students could use certain restroom by assuming the gender identity of a
student.36 This assumption would be “based on appearances, social
expectations, or explicit declarations of identity” rather than physiological
distinctions proven by a birth certificate.37 Judge Niemeyer reasoned that if
the legal definition of sex for the purposes of segregating restrooms must
include the gender identity that a student chooses, instead of biological sex,
then the majority’s position is “at odds with common sense.”38
Because the Fourth Circuit reversed the finding of the district court,
Gloucester County School Board petitioned for a writ of certiorari so that
the case may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The mandate of the Fourth
Circuit has been stayed, pending timely filing and disposition of a petition
for a writ of certiorari; however, the issue of whether the definition of sex
should include or exclude gender identity will not be reviewed.39
This Note will explain why Niemeyer’s dissent in Grimm was correct.
The legal definition of sex should be determined by physiological
distinctions. This Note will argue that there needs to be a legal definition of
transgender, which should be determined by physiological makeup, because
transgender physiology is distinguishable from that of the binary sexes.
Accordingly, gender identity should not control sex.
This Note will propose a two-step analysis to determine whether a
transgender person has standing to sue for sex discrimination. This Note
will further show how the symptoms of gender dysphoria are analogous to
those of I.I.E.D. plaintiffs.40 It will argue the courts should not be eager to

36. Id. at 738.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S.Ct. 2442 (2016).
40. Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 90 (1976) (stating that “‘[t]he law intervenes only
where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The
intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity’”);
Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 514-15 (1998) (The plaintiff regularly underwent psychotherapy
and lived in fear propelling her to buy a bullet proof vest. The plaintiff was treated for anxiety and
suffered mood changes, insomnia, nightmares, flashbacks of the incident, and symptoms that
persisted for over two years after the incident. The plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder. The court found these symptoms sufficiently severe.); Decker v. Princeton Packet
Inc., 116 N.J. 418, 431 (1989) (The plaintiff’s symptoms were not severe because the alleged
emotional distress approximates the subjective reactions of ordinary persons who feel victimized,
annoyance, embarrassment, or irritation. Distress not occasioned by conduct that itself was
egregious or purposeful but rather caused by inadvertent conduct is not severe.); Buckley v.
Trenton Sav. Fund Soc’y, 111 N.J. 355, 268-69 (1988) (The plaintiff’s symptoms were not
sufficiently severe because the symptoms were “nothing more than aggravation, embarrassment,
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give a remedy to transgender persons for their suffering when the court
disfavors giving a remedy to those who suffer the same degree of emotional
distress, only from a different source.41 The legal standard of sex should be
stringent so that the court is not overwhelmed by litigation over
psychological distress issues, but the standard should not be so strict that
there is no room to accommodate a transgender person’s needs.42 In order
to create a workable, yet logical legal definition of sex, the concerns for
privacy and equality must be balanced.43
III. FRAMING THE ISSUE
A. Gender Identity: A Disorder of Belief
1. Discrimination Previously Defined by Objectively Apparent
Physiological Distinctions.
“There are both real and fictional differences between women and
men.”44 These differences are at the core of disputes where the definition of
sex is needed to establish a particular plaintiff’s sex, such as in cases
determining whether there has been a violation of the Civil Rights Act of
an unspecified number of headaches, and loss of sleep.”); Turner v. Wong, 832 A.2d 340, 348 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff did not establish severe emotional distress
because there had been no dramatic impact on her everyday activities and her ability to function);
Griffin v. Tops Appliance City, Inc., 766 A.2d 292 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (The plaintiff’s
symptoms were not severe because the plaintiff “testified [only] “that he ‘felt bad,’” and “[h]is wife
testified that plaintiff was ‘devastated’ . . . and that ‘[h]is whole personality changed.’”); Twyman v.
Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (utter despair, falling apart, and mental anguish are not
sufficiently severe to support a finding of severe emotional distress); Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252,
262-63 (Tex. App. 2001) (citation omitted) (The law intervenes only where the distress is so severe
that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it. The plaintiff suffered an ulcer, felt
worthless, ashamed, grinded her teeth so hard that some are cracked, severe depression, suffered
post-traumatic stress disorder, needed of ongoing treatment after the incident, and years of abuse
were sufficiently severe to support a finding of severe emotional distress.); Russo v. White, 241 Va.
23, 28 (1991) (Nervousness, sleeplessness, stress and its physical symptoms, withdrawal from
activities which might necessitate plaintiff leaving her daughter at home, [and] lack of
concentration at work to the point where she received a reprimand was not sufficiently severe to
support a finding of severe emotional distress.).
41. Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 81 (2007) (stating that because of problems inherent in
proving a tort alleging injury to the mind or emotions in the absence of accompanying physical
injury, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not favored in the law).
42. Id.
43. See generally Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F.
Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
44. City of L.A., Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
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1964 or whether the person has been deprived of equal protection of the
laws under the U.S. Constitution.45 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
announces “that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to
the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.”46 “[I]ndividuals
have a right . . . to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex.”47 The
Fourth Circuit looked to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for guidance in
evaluating the claim brought by G.G. under Title IX alleging discrimination
based on sex.48
The definition of sex is a central issue in Title IX cases involving
transgender people.49 To include gender identity in the legal definition of
sex would greatly expand the scope of litigation to include disputes over the
separation of living facilities, locker rooms, shower facilities, and other
public facilities. 50 For example, in Grimm, the plaintiff’s claim “only
challenge[d] the definition and application of the term ‘sex’ with respect to
separate restrooms[; however], accept[ing] [her] argument would
necessarily change the definition of ‘sex’ for purposes of assigning separate
living facilities, locker rooms, and shower facilities as well.”51
Due to the fear of excessive litigation, along with many other policy
issues, the majority of courts have concluded that discrimination against a
transgender person based on that person’s gender identity is not sex
discrimination.52 Only a few courts have been willing to adopt an expansive
45. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1964).
46. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 U.S. 1775, 1784 (1989).
47. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
48. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 2016).
49. Id. at 721.
50. Id. at 715.
51. G.G. ex. rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
“discrimination . . . based on [a] person’s status as a transsexual is not discrimination
because [gender identity is not a protected class] under Title VII”); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (“hold[ing] that Title VII does not protect transsexuals”);
Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 669-70
(W.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that a transgender student failed to state an Equal Protection claim
based on his transgender status. The court found that the university’s policy of segregating
bathroom and locker room facilities on the basis of birth sex was “substantially related to a
sufficiently important government interest” and therefore did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.); Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1305-06 (N.D. Ga. 2010)
(holding avoiding lawsuits from transgender employees was a rational basis for terminating a
transgender employee. While the plaintiff properly stated a violation of Equal Protection
based on sex stereotyping, the fact that the plaintiff was transgender was not the grounds for
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interpretation of sex that would include transgender as a separate protected
class.53
In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that
transgender persons are not a protected class under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.54 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that even sex reassignment
surgery would not determine that person’s sex in order to become part of a
protected class.55 The court made the distinction between what a person
believes her gender to be and the constitutionally protected class of sex.56
Therefore, in Ulane, the court adhered to the determination that the term
sex was defined solely as a biological male or a biological female.57
In Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,58 the Ninth Circuit argued—
similar to the Ulane court—that transgender is not a protected class for the
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.59 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
discrimination based on gender identity alone does not constitute sex
discrimination.60 This conclusion hinged on the concept that if a person is
born with certain physiological distinctions which constitute a certain sex,
then that person is that specific sex throughout his or her lifetime.61 The
takeaway from Holloway is that sex is determined by “‘immutable
characteristics determined solely by the accident of birth,’ much like race or
national origin.” 62 For the Ninth Circuit, gender identity is not a factor in
determining sex.
In Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth System of
Higher Education, the United States District Court of the Western District
of Pennsylvania stated that “[m]any courts have defined ‘sex’ . . . as the
biological sex assigned to a person at birth.”63 The court reasoned that “the

the Equal Protection claim.); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999-1000
(N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that an employer’s requirement that the employee use only the
men’s restroom as a transgender male was not sex stereotyping discrimination under Title
VII).
53. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221.
54. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084.
55. Id. at 1086-87.
56. Id. at 1087.
57. Id.
58. Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 663 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
63. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657,
670 (W.D. Pa. 2015), appeal dismissed (Mar. 30, 2016).
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law [has] recognize[d] certain distinctions between male[s] and female[s]
on the basis of birth sex.”64 The phrase of Title VII prohibiting
discrimination is based on the “impl[ication] that it is unlawful to
discriminate against women because they are women and against men
because they are men.”65 Therefore, the Johnson court also adhered to the
common theme that discrimination has historically been decided in the
context of physiological distinctions which is based on an objective
standard, not the subjective standard of gender identity.66

2. Apparent Gender Controlled by the Subjective Standard of Gender
Identity67
In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County, the Fourth Circuit
communicated that gender identity is nothing but a subjective belief.68
Judge Floyd made clear that he believed gender identity is a purely
subjective standard.69 He stated that gender identity should not be included
in the legal definition of sex because the plaintiff’s gender identity is in
“[her] mind. It’s not physical that causes that, it’s what [s]he believes.”70
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that “a prohibition against discrimination
based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual identity disorder or
discontent with the sex into which they were born.”71 The Seventh Circuit in
Ulane described similarly how Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not
prohibit discrimination against a person with gender identity disorder.72
In Spearman v. Ford Motor Company, the Seventh Circuit supported and
utilized Ulane’s reasoning in its decision, stating that Ulane’s rule regarding
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is still continuing in vitality. 73 The term
gender identity disorder comes from the state of “a profound divergence
between an individual’s assigned birth sex and the person’s inner gender
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 671.
Id. (quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)).
Id. at 675-76.
Prabhat S., Difference between Transgender and Transsexual, DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN.NET, http://www.differencebetween.net/science/difference-between-transgenderand-transsexual/ (last visited on Sept. 16, 2017).
68. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 721 (4th Cir. 2016).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 726.
71. Id.
72. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
73. Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Ulane v.
E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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identity.”74 The court in Spearman noted, regardless of the interplay
between the two concepts, there is a distinction between birth sex and
gender identity.75
The court in Kasti v. Maricopa evaluated three factors in determining a
person’s sex: “(1) phenotypic characteristics; (2) endogenous hormonal
characteristics; and (3) chromosomal characteristics.”76 For a majority of
courts, the underlying basis of sex are the physiological differences between
males and females, not a subjective belief.77 A subjective determination of
sex is not a good legal standard because “Congress[, in passing the Civil
Rights Act,] intended the term ‘sex’ to mean biological male or biological
female” so the courts should defer to Congress and adopt a narrow
interpretation of the word sex to exclude a transgender person’s
determining her own sex based solely on gender identity.78
B. Competing Values: The Transgender and the Right to Privacy
1. The Transgender Person’s Difficult Plight Regarding Restroom
Choice
For most students, choosing a restroom is a simple decision. However,
for transgender students, it is a very hard decision. Whichever restroom is
chosen, the transgender person faces potential harassment or violence.79 In
a survey conducted by Dylan Vade, 48 of 116 transgender people responded
with stories detailing specific restroom experiences ranging from “being
physically abused, verbally harassed, fired, arrested, [or being] ill from
avoiding restrooms altogether.80 Recent statistics show that one-in-four
74. Stacy v. LSI Corp, 544 Fed. Appx. 93, 94-95 (3d. Cir. 2013).
75. Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084 (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087
(7th Cir. 1984)).
76. Kasti v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No CV-02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL
2460636 at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2006), aff'd, 325 F. App'x 492 (9th Cir. 2009) .
77. Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 WL 21525058, at *3
(S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003).
78. Id. (emphasis added).; see also Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999
(N.D. Ohio 2003) (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1984));
Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084 (citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir.
1984)).
79. Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public Regulation of
Gender and its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE L.J. 65, 67 (2013),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Herman-Gendered-Restroomsand-Minority-Stress-June-2013.pdf.
80. Id.
(citing
Dylan
Vade,
Gender
Neutral
Bathroom
Survey,
http://archive.srlp.org/files/ documents/toolkit/gnb_survey.pdf).
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transgender persons “has faced a bias-driven assault” and these rates are
even higher for transgender women and people of color.81
Transgender persons also face rising threats of violence.82 Grade levels
for transgender students are starkly lower than other students due to the
frequent harassment and bullying from other students.83 Therefore, the
transgender person’s plight in choosing a restroom is a catch twenty-two—
whichever bathroom a transgender person chooses, he or she is left with
negative consequences.84
In Grimm, the plaintiff had similar restroom concerns.85 G.G’s complaint
stated that when the school board adopted a restroom policy that forced her
to either use the gender neutral or girls’ bathroom, she felt as if she had
been “stripped of [her] privacy and dignity.”86 G.G. stated that the gender
neutral bathrooms made her feel stigmatized and isolated because all of her
peers knew that the restroom was installed specifically for her as a
transgender.87 The separate restroom served as a daily reminder that the
school viewed her as different and it placed her in a humiliating position
that “accentuat[ed her] ‘otherness.’”88
Such isolation for the transgender individual creates “severe and
persistent emotional and social harms.”89 The expert testimony from Dr.
Ettner in Grimm stated that G.G. was “place[d] . . . at [an] extreme risk for
immediate and long-term psychological harm.90 For G.G., the emotional

81. NATIONAL
CENTER
FOR
TRANSGENDER
EQUALITY
(2015),
http://www.transequality.org/issues/anti-violence.
82. Id.
83. Tonei Glavinic, Research Shows Lack of Support for Transgender and GenderNonconforming Youth in U.S. School Systems, 2 INQUIRIES JOURNAL 1(2010)
http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/135/research-shows-lack-of-support-fortransgender-and-gender-nonconforming-youth-in-us-school-systems.
84. See Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public Regulation
of Gender and its Impact on Transgender People’s Lives, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE L.J. 65, 67
(2013),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Herman-GenderedRestrooms-and-Minority-Stress-June-2013.pdf.
85. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated, 137 S.Ct. 1239 (2017).
86. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 749 (E.D. Va.
2015).
87. Id. at 741.
88. Id. at 728.
89. See id. at 717.
90. Id. at 728.
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harm festered into acute physical harm. She suffered multiple urinary tract
infections because she avoided using the restroom at school.91
In order to lessen the effects of having gender dysphoria, some
transgender students receive treatment for the disorder.92 One part of this
treatment is living consistently with one’s gender identity, which means
using the restroom that matches one’s gender identity.93 This treatment
involves mental health counseling, hormone treatment, speech and
language therapy, and peer groups to support living consistently with one’s
gender identity.94 One of the purposes of this treatment is to help the
transgender person lessen the psychological distress that accompanies
gender dysphoria.95
In Grimm, G.G. argued that she cannot use the restroom that matches
her biological sex because it would cause her severe psychological distress,
which “would be incompatible with [her] treatment for gender
dysphoria.”96 The severe psychological distress would stem from negative
reactions from those in the restroom. G.G. argued that she would be
psychologically harmed by those who would perceive her as being the
opposite sex in the wrong restroom.97
The concurring opinion of Judge Davis insisted that G.G. be able to
access the restroom consistent with her gender identity because she would
suffer greater harm, as a transgender, than the other students.98 Davis stated
that there would be minimal or even non-existent hardship to other
students for them to use the single-stall restrooms if they objected to a
transgender student’s presence in the communal restroom.99 Davis further
argued that not allowing a transgender student to use the restroom of his or
her choice, rather than a unisex bathroom, would cause more harm than
requiring students who object to a transgender person’s presence in a
communal restroom to use a unisex restroom.100 The dissent in Grimm
91. Id. at 727.
92. See, e.g., Grimm, 822 F.3d at 727 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
93. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739 (E.D.
Va. 2015).
94. Gender dysphoria – Treatment, NHS CHOICES (Dec. 4, 2016)
http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Gender-dysphoria/Pages/Treatment.aspx.
95. See id.
96. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 716.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 729 (Davis, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 729 (Davis, J., concurring).
100. Id.
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discussed the opposite problem, in that if the transgender male were
allowed to use the boys restroom, the boys would have similar feelings with
a biological female entering and using the bathroom.101 Therefore, the
transgender is not welcome in either restroom that is separated by the
binary form of sex.102
2. The Common Student’s Right to Privacy in School Restrooms.
There is an underlying competition of interests at stake between the
transgender person’s right to the public facilities of his or her choosing and
the community’s traditional understanding of sex-specific bathrooms.103
The transgender person’s interest is to avoid being forced to use a restroom
when he or she does not identify with that restroom’s biological
designation.104 The community’s interest is keeping the universally accepted
protections of privacy and safety based on the anatomical differences
between the sexes.105
The Johnson court stated that “at the heart of [a] case” concerning a
transgender student’s right to the restroom of his or her choice “are two
important but competing interests.”106 One is the transgender person’s
“interest in performing some of life’s most basic and routine functions,
which take place in restrooms and locker rooms, in an environment
consistent with [his or her] gender identity.”107 The other interest is the
school’s “interest in providing its students with a safe and comfortable
environment for performing these same life functions consistent with
society’s long-held tradition of performing such functions in sex-segregated
spaces based on biological or birth sex.”108 In order to decide the case, the
court must weigh a delicate balance of interests in favor of each party to the
dispute. The court in Johnston upheld the policy that a school must “ensure
the privacy of its students to disrobe . . . outside of the presence of members
of the opposite sex.” 109 Accordingly, there is a delicate balance of interests
that needs to be weighed.

101. Id. at 730-31 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 730-31.
103. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657,
668 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 669.
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The Eighth Circuit has sought to balance the two opposing interests of
the transgender plaintiff and the collective.110 The Johnston court stated that
Title IX clearly permits schools to provide students with certain sexsegregated spaces to perform certain private activities and bodily functions
consistent with an individual’s physiological distinctions.111 Therefore, the
court made known that this balance of opposing forces must cling to the
policy behind the traditional separation of restrooms by physiological
distinctions in that persons with a certain physiology should not be subject
to exposure to persons with opposite physiology.112
With this policy in view, the transgender person’s subjective belief of
gender tends to be a peripheral concern to the central issue of privacy. The
policy of separating people by sex would be nullified if people chose a
bathroom in accordance with their understanding of their own gender,
regardless of whether their physiology was male or female.113 The common
man’s right to privacy in a restroom would be void.114 Therefore, the two
interests are diametrically opposed.
C. G. G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board
1. The Majority View as to the Definition of Sex is a Sum of
Morphological Peculiarities.
The majority opinion in Grimm took on the daunting task of defining
the term sex.115 The Fourth Circuit begins its analysis by stating the wellsettled rule that Title IX permits separate living spaces for the different
sexes, and that the Department of Education’s regulation permits the
separation of bathroom facilities.116 The Department’s Office of Civil Rights
gave guidance on how to determine which restroom a transgender should
use while at school.117 The Office of Civil Rights required schools to treat
transgender students consistent with their gender identity.118 The Fourth
Circuit determined that the guidance was silent as to whether a transgender

110. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982).
111. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 672-73.
112. Id. at 668.
113. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), vacated, 137 S.Ct. 1239 (2017).
114. Id. at 737.
115. Id. at 721 (majority opinion).
116. Id. at 718.
117. Id. at 715.
118. Id. at 718.
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person is male or female.119 It also stated that the term sex is ambiguous as
used in the guidance letter.120
The Court next proceeded to define the term sex.121 The Court first
looked to the dictionary definition of sex as it first was defined during the
era in which Title IX was promulgated:
[T]he sum of the morphological, physiological, and behavioral
peculiarities of living beings that subserves biparental
reproduction with its concomitant genetic segregation and
recombination which underlie most evolutionary change, that in
its typical dichotomous occurrence is usu[ally] genetically
controlled and associated with special sex chromosomes, and
that is typically manifested as maleness and femaleness . . . .122
The court used this definition to show that the concept of maleness and
femaleness, being distinct from each other solely through a binary fashion,
is not correct.123 A definition based on reproductive organs was not
universally descriptive.124 The court used this definition to allow leeway for
those who may have a chromosome or reproductive organ disorder.125
Implicit in the majority’s reasoning is the idea that transgender should be
defined as a specific category itself, rather than fitting into one of the binary
sexes.126
The court rejected the bright line rule that sex has always been what is
traditionally manifested as maleness and femaleness. Instead, the court
argued that a person’s sex should be dependent upon the various physical,
psychological, and social aspects of a person.127 A transgender person is
determined by the sum of the person’s “morphological, physiological, and
behavioral peculiarities.”128 This definition connotes that the foundation of
sex is not physiological characteristics, but rather that a person’s
119. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 720.
120. Id. at 720 (stating that the guidance is susceptible to both the Board’s reading that
sex is determined by exclusive reference to genitalia or the department’s interpretation that
sex is determined by gender identity).
121. Id. at 721.
122. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER, WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2081 (Philip Gove, ed., Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1971)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721.
126. Id. at 721-22.
127. Id. at 722.
128. Id.
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physiological characteristics is simply a factor among many that determine
a person’s sex.129
The court used a dictionary to define sex simply as a sum of those
anatomical and physiological differences with reference to which the male
and female are distinguished.130 The court argued that if sex is simply a sum
of differences, then one person’s “sum” may be different than the traditional
male or female sum of factors.131 The court reasoned that manifestations of
maleness and femaleness typically evidence maleness and femaleness, but
since sex is made up of a host of factors, the binary definition of sex simply
does not work.132 The court determined that since the physical,
psychological, and social aspects of a human being are always changing,
there is room for the biological, physiological, and behavioral peculiarities
of the transgender to be included in the definition of sex.133 Gender identity
is now an important factor in what makes a person a particular sex.
2. The Dissenting Opinion’s View as to the Definition of Sex as
Physiological Differences Between Males and Females.
The underlying theme of Judge Niemeyer’s dissent is that if the majority
opinion’s definition of sex prevails, then traditional Title IX separation
based on sex will be abolished.134 Niemeyer stated that the majority opinion
is not based on case law.135 The majority opinion relied solely on the Office
of Civil Rights letter, which is not law, but simply an interpretation of the
law by the Executive Branch.136 The dissent made it clear that instead of
solving the sex definition dispute, the letter from the Office of Civil Rights
letter made the standard for treatment of transgender students even more
confusing than before:
In one sentence it states that schools ‘generally must treat
transgender students consistent with their gender identity,’
whatever that means, and in the next sentence, it encourages
schools to provide ‘gender-neutral, individual-user facilities to

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
part).

Id. at 721-22.
Id.
Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721-22.
Id.
Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 737 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Grimm, 822 F.3d at 731, 737 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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any student who does not want to use shared sex-segregated
facilities.137
Niemeyer made it clear that the majority ventured into dangerous
territory in order to prescribe this new definition of sex, thereby unraveling
the definition that has been accepted and maintained order in society
throughout history.138 The majority may, for the first time ever, hold that a
school may not separate its restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of
sex.139 Niemeyer spoke of the gravity and weight of the majority decision.
He stated that the majority opinion “completely tramples on all universally
accepted protections of privacy and safety that are based on the anatomical
differences between the sexes.”140
Niemeyer refuted the majority opinion by giving numerous examples in
case law that state that sex must be determined by physiological differences
between males and females, not a subjective gender identity:
Across societies and throughout history, it has been
commonplace and universally accepted to separate public
restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of
biological sex in order to address privacy and safety concerns
arising from the biological differences between males and
females. An individual has a legitimate and important interest in
bodily privacy such that his or her nude or partially nude body . .
. are not exposed to persons of the opposite biological sex.
Indeed, courts have consistently recognized that the need for
such privacy is inherent in the nature and dignity of
humankind.141
“The right to bodily privacy is fundamental,” and students have a
significant privacy interest in their bodies.142 Niemeyer noted “that [the]
separati[on of] restrooms based on ‘acknowledged differences’ [between
males and females] serves to protect this . . . privacy interest [in one’s
body].”143 This privacy interest will remain because of the inherent physical
differences between men and women, which are enduring and render the

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 738.
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992).
Grimm, 822 F.3d at 735 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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two sexes nonfungible.144 The policy is to protect physical bodies, because
inherent physicality is at the root of the meaning of sex.145 The interests of
transgender persons must not prevail if they are based solely on a subjective
belief and if the consequences to transgender persons are solely
psychological.
Niemeyer noted that the majority opinion accepted the definition of sex
as including gender identity only to meet a particular plaintiff’s needs.146
The new definition of sex is an extreme measure designed to rationalize a
desired outcome that is unsupported by the law.147 The majority was swayed
by the idea that this new definition of sex would only apply to restrooms;
however, Niemeyer pointed out that the canons of statutory construction
will force this new definition to be applied uniformly throughout Title IX,
thereby opening it up to locker rooms and shower facilities.148 Therefore,
while the majority’s new definition of sex will remedy a particular plaintiff’s
needs, the ramifications and consequences of this new definition will result
in chaos for the collective.
Niemeyer then presented his argument based on dictionary
definitions.149 He cited seven dictionaries that, when defining sex, all refer to
physiological distinctions or reproductive organs.150 Niemeyer stated that
even today, Webster’s dictionary defines sex based on these same
physiological distinctions between males and females.151 The dissenting
opinion showed that majority opinion is unsupported by case law, logic,
and results in an unworkable outcome.152
Finally, Niemeyer demonstrated that the majority’s definition of sex as
gender identity cannot coexist with the longstanding rule that restrooms
should be separated by sex.153 If the majority opinion is interpreted to mean
that the term sex refers to both biological sex and gender identity, then the
transgender person could go into neither the girls nor boys restroom.154
This is because a transgender person, by definition, has a gender identity
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
Grimm, 822 F.3d at 735 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.
Grimm, 822 F.3d at 737 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737.
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different than that person’s sex.155 Therefore, the transgender could not
fulfill the conjunctive criteria that both a person’s sex and gender identity
must be in union to enter a restroom defined by either male or female.156 If
the majority’s definition of sex is interpreted to mean either biological sex
or gender identity, then a transgender student could use either the restroom
of their biological sex or of their gender identity.157 The majority argued for
the definition of sex as only gender identity, but this definition would
totally abolish the longstanding separation of restrooms by biological sex.158
If sex is determined by a person’s subjective determination of their own
gender, then there would be no way to implement a separation of
restrooms.159 This is because a person’s gender identity could vacillate and
in one moment a person could determine that he or she is male and enter
the male restroom, only to change their mind in in the next moment and
decide to be female and enter the female restroom.160
The dissent further argued that the new definition could only be policed
by gender stereotyping. 161 Since there is no way to know what a person’s
subjective gender is when he or she enters a restroom, the only way to
determine if he or she truly identifies as that sex is to assume that person’s
sex based on appearances, social expectations, or explicit declarations of
biological sex.162 Niemeyer argued that “by interpreting Title IX and the
regulations as ‘requiring schools to treat students consistent with their
gender identity,’ and by disallowing schools from treating students based on
their biological sex, the government’s position would . . . be at odds with
common sense.”163 The government argued that gender stereotyping is an
inappropriate way of determining which students will be allowed into a
specific restroom, despite its virtually assured reliance on such stereotyping
to implement the decision.164
The majority responded to this argument by stating that the dissent’s
definition of sex is no less of an adoption of gender stereotyping than the

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 737 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id.
159. G. G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 738 (E.D.
Va. 2016).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 738.
162. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 738 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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majority opinion’s definition of sex.165 Both the dissenting and majority
definitions failed to resolve the issue of gender stereotyping. They both
assumed a person’s sex based on appearances, social expectations, or
explicit declarations of biological sex.166 However, the dissenting opinion’s
definition of sex allows for a greater probability of a remedy after a
transgender person’s rights to a restroom have been breached. This is
because a standard based on physiological distinctions provides clear
guidance on the rights that have been violated and the conduct that is
prohibited.
IV. VIABLE SOLUTIONS
A transgender person’s subjective gender originates in the mind. In
Grimm, members of the community spoke at a Citizen’s Comment Period
held by the County School Board and expressed concerns about allowing
the plaintiff’s beliefs about her gender identity to be determine which
restroom she was allowed to use.167 The members of the community were
concerned that this standard could produce chaotic results.168 While the
community expressed harsh critiques of this standard, the transgender
plaintiff was not the main focus of the public’s concern; rather, the hostility
of the community focused on the possible abuse of this standard by other
students.169
The main issue with the school board’s regulation that allowed
transgender students to enter the restroom of their choice was that the rule
had to be enforced equally among the transgender students and nontransgender students alike.170 This would allow all students to migrate
between restrooms, depending on their particular gender identity at that
time, and would give expansive freedom to all students to abuse the
newfound rule.171 A community member voiced the concern that a student
who is not actually transgender would have the right to use the restroom of
his choice without restraint.172 This could result in harassment, bullying,
violence, and even sexual assault for all students. The community was
concerned that allowing students to choose the restroom of their choice
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 722 n.8 (majority opinion).
Id. at 738 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Grimm, 822 F.3d at 716 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 738 (Niemeyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 716 (majority opinion).
Id.
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based on subjective belief would degrade the historical tradition of
separation of restrooms and jeopardize privacy and safety. The underlying
concern is that if the choice of restroom is left up to the transgender person
based on subjective belief alone, the person could identify as a female one
day and identify as a male the next. The dissent concluded that defining sex
by gender identity would necessarily endanger the privacy rights of all
students in school restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities, because
the new definition “would have to be applied uniformly throughout [Title
IX].”173
The courts should not adopt a subjective standard, but rather, the courts
should eliminate these dire consequences by requiring an objective
standard.174 The courts should be wary of a shifting standard. In fact, courts
have always expressed deep concern over purely subjective standards.175
Courts should adopt an objective standard for three reasons: (1) to give
notice of the prohibited conduct;176 (2) to ease the duty of the court and jury
to determine the wrongfulness of the conduct and the severity of the burden
on the transgender;177 and (3) to limit frivolous lawsuits by individuals with
merely hurt feelings.178 These three reasons can be analyzed through the
analogous lens of the tort of I.I.E.D. In fact, the claims of the victim of
transgender discrimination and the victim of intentionally inflicted
emotional distress mirror one another in their subjective symptoms.179
A.The Courts Must Adopt an Objective Standard to Give Notice of What
Conduct is Prohibited.
The courts should create a rule to determine a person’s sex by that
person’s objective physiological characteristics in order to clearly define
what the prohibited conduct is, and how a person can avoid it.180 The
Supreme Court of Virginia in Almy v. Grisham stated that the tort of
I.I.E.D. is disfavored in the law because the prohibited conduct cannot be
173. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 736 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 734–35.
175. See, e.g., Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338 (1974) (holding that the court and the
jury would determine “whether defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous and
whether plaintiff’s emotional distress was severe” in a cause of action for emotional distress
without physical injury).
176. Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 81 (2007).
177. Id.
178. Womack, 215 Va. at 342.
179. Id.
180. Almy, 273 Va. at 81.
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defined objectively.181 Similarly, if a person’s status as a transgender
individual is merely a subjective choice, then there is no objective
component that defines the prohibited conduct. The courts should give the
public notice as to who is legally recognizable as transgender so that a
transgender person knows whether he or she is unlawfully entering a
restroom.
One of the issues in Grimm was how a public school should determine
whether a transgender person is a male or a female for the purpose of
accessing the restroom.182 The majority found that there was ambiguity in
the Department of Education’s regulation because the regulation could be
interpreted to mean that “maleness or femaleness” is determined either
“with reference exclusively to genitalia” or “with reference to gender
identity.”183 The court reviewed an extensive list of questions to determine
what makes a person physiologically transgender.184 These questions
included: (1) “which restroom would a transgender individual who had
undergone sex-reassignment surgery use?”185 (2) “[w]hat about an intersex
individual?”186 (3) “[w]hat about an individual born with X-X-Y sex
chromosomes?”187 (4) “[w]hat about an individual who lost external
genitalia in an accident?”188 The majority opinion used these questions to
show that the regulation was ambiguous. However, these questions also
show that even the majority opinion sought some objective standard to
determine the sex of a transgender person.189 If the court agreed that a
transgender person’s sex should be defined by a person’s subjective gender
identity, then the court would have asked questions based on a subjective
standard, rather than attacking the ambiguity with objective physiological
standards.190
This list of questions begs for a rule that emphatically states that
transgender is a separate and distinct sex.191 It provides an objective
determination of the definition of transgender. It is also this list of questions
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721.
Id.
Id.
Id. 720-21.
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that should be the basis for analysis by a court to determine whether a
person is male, female, or transgender. If the definition of sex is the
physiological distinctions between males and females, then the definition of
transgender should be the physiological distinctions between the
transgender person and the binary sexes.192 “The two sexes are not
fungible.”193 Neither are the transgender and the binary sexes.
The definition of a transgender person should be controlled by either
skewed chromosome count, sex-reassignment surgery, intersexuality, or
other physiological differences that exclude a person from fitting into either
category of male or female.194 Through this objective standard, all persons
would be able to determine what the prohibited conduct is, and how to
avoid that prohibited conduct by accessing the restroom that matches the
sex that corresponds to their physiology.
B. The Courts Must Adopt an Objective Standard to Ease the Duty of the
Court and Jury to Determine the Wrongful Conduct and Severity of the
Burden on the Transgender.
In Russo v. White, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that a primary
reason that the tort of I.I.E.D. is disfavored is because clear guidance is
lacking to those who must evaluate whether certain alleged conduct satisfies
all elements of the tort.195 A dissenting opinion in Twyman v. Twyman
stated that the tort should not be adopted in Texas because (1) “judges and
juries are guided by insufficient standards”; (2) “liability may be imposed
arbitrarily”; (3) “reported cases . . . disclose no uniform patterns”; and (4)
“the sensitivities of aggrieved people are entirely too subjective and
unpredictable.”196
The same concerns that arise in adjudicating I.I.E.D. cases also confront
courts adjudicating a claim brought by a transgender person based on his or
her subjective sense of identity. The courts and juries would be faced with
the amorphous task of determining whether the transgender person truly
identified with the gender identity that matched a restroom’s designated
sex.197

192. Id.
193. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
194. Id.
195. Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 26 (1991).
196. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tex. 1993).
197. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 721.
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In order to satisfy the tort of I.I.E.D., the Supreme Court of Virginia has
required an objective standard of physical injury. 198 The purpose of such a
standard was to foreclose the uncertain and speculative nature of the tort.
Because the same type of speculation would be present in the claim that a
person is a certain gender identity, the same type of objective physical
manifestation of that identity should be required. If the transgender person
were legally defined by physiological distinctions, courts and juries would
have a way to measure gender identity. They could do so through a variety
of means, including the use of medical records to prove these physiological
distinctions. Unlike medical records proving gender dysphoria, medical
records that show physiological distinctions prove a person’s sex could give
that person the right to access a restroom designated for individuals of that
biological sex. Therefore, the courts should use the physiological standard
when deciding this issue.199
The physiological standard used to define a transgender person as a
separate sex determined by physiological features would give the
transgender person a dependable claim. It would also give the courts a
baseline standard that would help decide a case regarding transgender
rights. If the subjective standard of the transgender person’s selfdetermination is the only standard on which the definition of sex is
founded, it would result in excessive litigation. As the dissent in Grimm
stated, the separation of restrooms based on sex will be impossible.200 There
would be no way to distinguish one sex from the other.201 It is impossible to
know an individual’s subjective gender identity when that person enters a
restroom.202
Using a subjective standard would result in many lawsuits launched both
by people believing that someone has entered the wrong restroom, and by
people who are asked to leave a restroom to which they rightly identify. If
the physiological standard is used, the risk of either type of lawsuit will be
reduced. A transgender person who is asked to leave a certain restroom
would have medical records to show in court that he or she is a legally
cognizable transgender person. Therefore, the objective definition of a

198. Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23, 26 (1991).
199. G.G. ex. rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 735 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. G. G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 740 (E.D.
Va. 2016) (listing the concern of a commentator that “non-transgender boys” would pretend
to be transgender to get access to the girls’ restroom).
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transgender person would give clear guidance to the courts and juries as to
a transgender person’s rights to access the restroom of his or her choice.
C. The Courts Should Adopt an Objective Standard for Injury to Limit
Frivolous Lawsuits Where There are Merely Hurt Feelings Involved.
The Supreme Court of Virginia laid down a principle for I.I.E.D. cases
that could also guide the analysis of the definition of sex in the transgender
restroom conflict.203 In order to state a claim for I.I.E.D., there are four
elements that must be satisfied.204 One of the elements is severe emotional
distress.205 This element is “aimed at limiting frivolous suits and avoiding
litigation in situations where only bad manners and mere hurt feelings are
involved.”206 The “hurt feelings” hurdle has proved to be a high standard to
pass.207
In Russo v. White, the Court found that nervousness, sleep deprivation,
stress and its physical symptoms, withdrawal from activities, and inability to
concentrate at work failed to show a “type of extreme emotional distress
that is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure
it.”208 The Supreme Court of Virginia was not clear as to whether these
symptoms constitute “hurt feelings,” but the Court’s ruling makes clear that
the policy underlying the element of severe emotional distress is not
satisfied by these traits.209

203. Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342 (1974).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490 (1998) (stating that an “objective standard
ensures that defendants are not held liable when hypersensitive plaintiffs suffer severe
emotional trauma from conduct that would not seriously wound most people”); Twyman v.
Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 631 (Tex. 1993) (stating, “there is no occasion for the law to
intervene in every case where some one’s feelings are hurt”) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965)); Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 360
N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ill. 1976) (stating, “[t]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is
so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the
duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity”) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965)); Lascurain v. City of
Newark, 793 A.2d 731, 748 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff did not
establish severe emotional distress when “[t]here ha[d] not been the type of dramatic impact
on her every-day activities or on her ability to function daily”).
208. Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23 (1991).
209. Id.
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In Twyman, the Supreme Court of Texas found that “utter despair” and
“[falling] apart” did not constitute severe emotional distress in order to
satisfy the tort.210 The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Taylor v. Metzger
reasoned that the plaintiff’s emotional distress could be enough to convince
a factfinder that she had severe emotional distress when she underwent
psychotherapy, lived in fear which induced her to buy self-defense gear, and
was treated for anxiety.211 The plaintiff also experienced nightmares of the
incident, her symptoms lasted for two years, and she was diagnosed as
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.212 In Buckley v. Trenton, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a plaintiff’s “complaints
amount[ing]
to
nothing
more
than
aggravation,
embarrassment, . . . headaches, and loss of sleep” were not sufficiently
severe to satisfy the requirements of the tort.213 Therefore, emotional
distress, according to the 46 states that recognize the tort of I.I.E.D., must be
severe and objectively ascertainable.214
The plaintiff in Grimm gave a list of her symptoms that included feeling
as though her dignity and privacy had been stripped; feeling stigmatized
and isolated; feeling humiliated; feeling set apart from peers; being at
extreme risk for immediate and long-term psychological harm; and, finally,
refraining from performing certain bodily functions, which led to short
term illness.215 Taking into account the precedent set by the tort of I.I.E.D.,
G.G.’s symptoms did not reach the level of severe emotional distress
required for the court to remedy these injuries.216
The standard for a remedial transgender injury should be something
equal to or more than the emotional distress needed to satisfy a basic tort.
The symptoms that the transgender individual suffers would not be
sufficient for recovery if alleged under similar tort law; therefore, the
transgender individual should be held to the same standard. While the
plaintiff in Grimm experienced psychological harm and physical harm,
because this harm would not be sufficient for recovery under I.I.E.D. , the
courts should not intervene.217

210. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tex. 1993) (Phillips, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
211. Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 697 (NJ. 1998).
212. Id.
213. Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc., 544 A.2d 857, 864 (N.J. 1988).
214. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621.
215. G.G. ex. rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716-17 (4th Cir. 2016).
216. Id.
217. Id.

2018]

DIVERGENCE OF BINARY SEX AND THE TRANSGENDER

789

V. CONCLUSION
The definition of sex should remain the bright line rule that it has been
throughout time—the physiological distinctions between males and
females.218 Transgender should be a new branch within the definition of sex
that is based on physiological distinctions between transgender people and
the binary sexes. In other words, the legal definition of sex should include
three branches: male, female, and transgender. The legal definition of
transgender should not be an individual’s subjective sense of gender
identity.219 A claim of transgender discrimination based solely on subjective
beliefs and psychological distress would cause uncertainty and speculation
on the part of the court, the factfinder, and the person seeking to avoid the
unlawful conduct.
The courts should determine a claim by a transgender person by first
determining whether the person is a transgender person as physiologically
and legally defined; and second, by determining whether the injury is
sufficient as a matter of law. The extent of the injury should be determined
through the lens of the claim for I.I.E.D. The symptoms alleged by the
transgender plaintiff are analogous to those alleged by an I.I.E.D. plaintiff.220
Analogous reasoning based on I.I.E.D analysis is crucial to analyzing the
policy underlying transgender discrimination claims.221 The policy for the
requirements of a cause of action for I.I.E.D. is that the courts should not
have to decide cases based on “hurt feelings.”222 The same is true for
transgender discrimination. If a transgender person brings a claim to court
that he or she has been discriminated against based on his or her
transgender status, premised on a psychic injury and evidenced by nothing
more than personal beliefs and psychological injuries, he or she is likely to
lose the case. It is possible that such a person may not even have standing in
court.
On the other hand, if the transgender person can survive the two-step
analysis set forth in this Note, he or she will have a successful claim of
discrimination based on his or her transgender status. First, the individual
218. Id. at 734 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219. Prabhat S., Difference between Transgender and Transsexual, DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN.NET, http://www.differencebetween.net/science/difference-between-transgenderand-transsexual/ (last visited on Sept. 16, 2017) (stating that “transgender is pertained to be
the behavior” of an individual who identifies with the opposite of his or her biological sex)
(emphasis added).
220. Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342 (1974).
221. See Russo v. White, 241 Va. 23 (1991).
222. Womack, 215 Va. at 341.
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must demonstrate that he or she is a legally recognized transgender person
with the requisite physiological characteristics: having a skewed
chromosome count, having undergone sex-reassignment surgery, being
intersex, or having another physiological difference that excludes a person
from fitting into either category of male or female. The second step of the
analysis is that the transgender individual must have a sufficient injury
resulting from being discriminated against. After proving these two steps,
the transgender individual should be allowed into the restroom of the sex
that matches his or her physiology. If the transgender person is not allowed
to enter, the transgender person should be able to recover for his or her
injury in court, so long as there is sufficient evidence to support a finding
that the injury has in fact occurred.

